Preemption and Federal Administrative Law

This is a condensed version of the authors' longer work, quot;Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Non delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power,quot; Duke Law Journal, Vol. 57, p. 1933, 2008. It offers a short, accessible overview of our argument that (contra the apparent recent holding in Wyeth v. Levine) Congress should not be obliged clearly to delegate the power to preempt before an agency can exercise that power

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Year of publication:	[2019]
Authors:	Galle, Brian D.
Other Persons:	Seidenfeld, Mark (contributor)
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Öffentliche Verwaltung \| Public administration \| Verwaltungsrecht \| Administrative law \| Föderalismus \| Federalism

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (3 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: 34 Admin. & Reg. L. News 5 (2009) Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 4, 2009 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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