Preemptive Adoptions of an Emerging Technology.
Many oligopolies exhibit continuing technological change and lumpy costs of adopting new technologies. If firms choose adoption dates in a game of timing and if the downstream market structure is a Bertrand duopoly, the equilibrium adoption pattern displays rent-dissipating increasing dominance, i.e., all adoptions are by the same firm, and the discounted value of profits is zero. These results need not hold for other market structures, including Cournot duopoly. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year of publication: |
1994
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Authors: | Riordan, Michael H ; Salant, David J |
Published in: |
Journal of Industrial Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 42.1994, 3, p. 247-61
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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