Preemptive Bidding in Takeover Auctions: An Experimental Study
This paper presents the results of an experimental study on jump bidding in takeover auctions with entry costs. It provides support for signaling hypothesis behind jump bidding and analyzes how the size of the entry costs affects the bidders' behavior and their expected profits. It also shows that jump bidding allows the reallocation of the surplus from the seller to the first bidder but has little effect on the social surplus and the profits of the second bidder. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Khoroshilov, Yuri ; Dodonova, Anna |
Published in: |
Managerial and Decision Economics. - John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., ISSN 0143-6570. - Vol. 35.2014, 3, p. 216-230
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Publisher: |
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
Saved in:
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