Preference Aggregation Functions and Arrows Theorem

The aim of this paper is to present Arrow's theorem and more generally the common framework of many results which can be called "Arrovian theorems". One begins by recalling the Condorcet majority rules, and why they fail: the "effet Condorcet". These rules are examples of preference aggregation functions defined by a simple game, and then one seeks if in the class of all these functions one can find functions avoiding this problem.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Nomia, O.
Institutions:	Centre de recherche de mathématiques et économie mathématique (CERMSEM), Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne
Subject:	GAMES \| PREFERENCE CHOICES

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Series:	Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	23 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005776568