Preference domains and the monotonicity of condorcet extensions
Year of publication: |
May 2015
|
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Authors: | Healy, Paul J. ; Peress, Michael |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 130.2015, p. 21-23
|
Subject: | Condorcet winner | Nash implementation | Voting rules | Theorie | Theory | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium |
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