Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
Year of publication: |
1993
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arya, Anil |
Other Persons: | Young, Richard A. (contributor) ; Fellingham, John C. (contributor) |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 42.1993, 1, p. 25-30
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertrag | Contract | Theorie | Theory |
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