Preference, value, choice, and welfare

Intro -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Preface -- 1. Preferences, Comparative Evaluations, and Reasons -- 1.1. What are preferences? -- 1.2. Overall and total comparative evaluations -- 1.3. Preferences, reasons, and folk psychology -- 1.4. Misconceptions concerning preferences -- 1.5. Conclusions -- Part I: Preferences in Positive Economics -- 2. Preference Axioms and Their Implications -- 2.1. The axioms of ordinal utility theory -- 2.2. Implications of the axioms for the understanding of preferences -- 2.3. Rationality and preferences -- 2.4. Preferences and self-interest -- 3. Revealed-Preference Theory -- 3.1. Actual revealed preferences and the revelation theorem -- 3.2. Critique of actual revealed-preference theory -- 3.3. Why not redefine preferences in terms of choice? -- 3.4. Hypothetical revealed preferences -- 3.5. Belief-dependent revealed preferences -- 3.6. Conclusions -- 4. Preferences, Decision Theory, and Consequentialism -- 4.1. Total subjective comparative evaluations -- 4.2. Using preferences to predict and explain choices: The standard model -- 4.3. Expected-utility theory -- 4.4. What does expected-utility theory accomplish? -- 4.5. Consequentialism and standard choice theory -- 4.6. Attributes and preferences -- 4.7. Conclusions -- 5. Game Theory and Consequentialism -- 5.1. Games and outcomes -- 5.2. Consequentialism in game theory -- 5.3. The default principle -- 5.4. Conclusions: The consequences of consequentialism -- 6. Constraints and Counterpreferential Choice -- 6.1. Sympathy and commitment -- 6.2. Commitment and counterpreferential choice -- 6.3. Constraints and counterpreferential choice -- 6.4. Many concepts of preference or just one? -- 6.5. Game theory and counterpreferential choice -- 6.6. Commitments and intentions -- 6.7. Conclusions.