Preferences over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, the authors find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. They identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash. The key axiom is mixture symmetry, implying that if two solutions are equally attractive, then the half-half mixture of them is (weakly) preferred to any other mixture of the two.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Border, Kim C. ; Segal, Uzi |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 65.1997, 1, p. 1-18
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
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