Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful
A key feature of the recent EU and OECD standards for good behavior in international taxation is a presumption against preferential tax regimes (such as those offering advantageous treatment to non-residents or enterprises not active in the domestic market), which are seen as especially corrosive forms of tax competition. This paper shows that, on the contrary, preferential regimes may serve a useful strategic purpose in enabling countries to confine their most aggressive tax competition to particular parts of the tax system. Proscribing them therefore may--in the model here, certainly will--actually worsen tax competition.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Keen, Michael |
Published in: |
National Tax Journal. - National Tax Association - NTA. - Vol. 54.2001, n. 4, p. 757-62
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Publisher: |
National Tax Association - NTA |
Saved in:
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