Prevention of Herding by Experts

Experts tend to herd if they can communicate among themselves. I show that every expert can be induced to do independent research and report truthful results if and only if payments to the expert depend on other experts' reports. If the experts are risk-averse then the prevention of herding is costly

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Kargin, Vladislav
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Verhaltensökonomik \| Behavioral economics \| Theorie \| Theory \| Experten \| Experts
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2003 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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