Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
This article analyzes the duality of prices and quantities in a differentiated duopoly. It is shown that if firms can only make two types of binding contracts with consumers, the price contract and the quantity contract, it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity (price) contract, provided the goods are substitutes (complements).
Year of publication: |
1984
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Authors: | Singh, Nirvikar ; Vives, Xavier |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 15.1984, 4, p. 546-554
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
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