Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

Maria Alipranti; Chrysovalantou Milliou; Emmanuel Petrakis

This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower final prices, higher consumers' surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Alipranti, Maria ; Milliou, Chrysovalantou ; Petrakēs, Emmanuēl
Publisher:	Düsseldorf : DICE
Subject:	Cournot \| Bertrand \| vertical relations \| two-part tariffs \| Theorie \| Theory \| Vertikale Integration \| Vertical integration \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Duopol \| Duopoly \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition \| Preismanagement \| Pricing strategy \| Preisdifferenzierung \| Price discrimination \| Wettbewerb \| Competition

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (11 S.)
Series:	DICE discussion paper. - Düsseldorf, Germany : düsseldorf university press, ISSN 2190-9938, ZDB-ID 2578649-0. - Vol. 146
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
ISBN:	978-3-86304-145-8
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/96924 [Handle]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010351502