Pricing of Pollution: The Coase Theorem in the Long Run
In an earlier article in The Bell Journal, Tybout argues that even in a zero transaction costs model, bribery to reduce pollution and compensation charges for it result in different total profits, and thus in different long-run behavior. Therefore, the Coase Theorem is refuted for the long-run case.
Year of publication: |
1973
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Authors: | III, H.E. Frech |
Published in: |
Bell Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0361-915X. - Vol. 4.1973, 1, p. 316-319
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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