Principal-agent contracts under the threat of insurance
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Tommasi, Mariano ; Weinschelbaum, Federico |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 163.2007, 3, p. 379-393
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Theorie | Theory |
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