Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance: The Case of Mandatory Individual Pension Accounts

A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problemis wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further ine±-ciencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularlythe one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.

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Year of publication:	2009-01-14
Authors:	Román, Juan Manuel Julio
Institutions:	BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA
Subject:	Incentives \| Agency Theory \| Pensions

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Series:	BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	2 pages long
Classification:	D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G23 - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597607