Principals' principles when agents' actions are hidden
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Keser, C. ; Willinger, M. |
Published in: |
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 8753556. - Vol. 18.2000, 1, p. 163-186
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