Prinzipien der Anreizgestaltung bei Risikoaversion und sozialen Präferenzen
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Meyer, Barbara ; Pfeiffer, Thomas |
Published in: |
Journal of business economics : JBE. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0044-2372, ZDB-ID 201074-4. - Vol. 74.2004, 10, p. 1047-1075
|
Subject: | Anreiz | Incentives | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Experiment |
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