Prioritarianism in Practice
“Prioritarianism” is an ethical theory that gives extra weight to the well-being of the worse off. Prioritarianism has been much discussed in the philosophical literature over the last thirty years, where it has emerged as an important competitor to utilitarianism. Like utilitarianism, prioritarianism is welfarist: it conceptualizes social outcomes as patterns of well-being among the population of ethical concern. Unlike utilitarianism, prioritarianism does not simply add up well-being, but plugs well-being numbers into a concave “transformation” function—the effect of which is to upweight well-being changes affecting those at lower levels of well-being.Prioritarianism occupies the whole space between utilitarianism (no priority for those at lower levels of well-being) and the so-called “leximin” view (absolute priority to every worse-off person over every better-off one). As the transformation function approaches linearity, prioritarianism approaches utilitarianism. As it becomes increasingly concave, prioritarianism approaches leximin.Prioritarianism differs from egalitarianism (even an egalitarianism that focuses on the distribution of well-being rather than resources or capabilities). Welfare-egalitarianism is non-separable: the difference in the degree of well-being inequality between two outcomes depends upon the well-being levels of everyone in the population—even unaffected individuals (those with the same well-being in both). By contrast, prioritarianism is separable: the ethical comparison of outcomes depends only on the well-being of those who stand to gain or lose, not unaffected individuals. This separability feature of prioritarianism renders it much more tractable for purposes of policy analysis. The distinctive features of prioritarianism can be expressed axiomatically. Prioritarianism satisfies the Pareto principle (increasing the well-being of some, with none made worse off, is an ethical improvement); the Pigou-Dalton principle (a pure transfer of well-being from someone better-off, to someone worse-off, that reduces the well-being gap between them and leaves everyone else unaffected, is an ethical improvement); and Separability (the ethical comparison of outcomes is independent of the well-being level of unaffected individuals). Utilitarianism satisfies Pareto and Separability but not Pigou-Dalton. Egalitarianism satisfies Pigou-Dalton and may satisfy Pareto, but not Separability.This edited volume, “Prioritarianism in Practice,” moves beyond the theory of prioritarianism and systematically examines its application as a policy-analysis tool. The book is the product of an international network of scholars, the Prioritarianism in Practice Research Network, which the editors organized. Prioritarianism is compared to utilitarianism and to extant policy methodologies (cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis) across a variety of policy domains: taxation, health policy, fatality risk regulation, climate change, education, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Prioritarianism is also compared to GDP as a metric of social progress. In addition, the volume includes theory chapters on the theory of prioritarianism, well-being measurement, and how prioritarianism might be synthesized with the literature on equality of opportunity (EOp); and a chapter reviewing studies that seek to elicit individuals’ ethical preferences, which considers how well prioritarianism coheres with these preferences
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Adler, Matthew D. ; Norheim, Ole Frithjof |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Saved in:
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
---|---|
Series: | Prioritarianism in Practice (Matthew D. Adler and Ole F. Norheim, eds. ; Cambridge University Press |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 19, 2022 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014080277
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Adler, Matthew D., (2022)
-
Disability compensation and responsibility
Cappelen, Alexander W., (2008)
-
Mæstad, Ottar, (2009)
- More ...