Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
Year of publication: |
March 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cantala, David ; Pereyra, Juan |
Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 21.2017, 1, p. 49-63
|
Subject: | Two-sided many-to-one matching | School choice | Boston algorithm | Manipulation strategies | Deferred acceptance algorithm | Theorie | Theory | Matching | Schulauswahl | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Algorithmus | Algorithm |
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