Private information in monopoly with random participation

In a setting with random participation the seller achieves higher expected profits under intermediate private information when the heterogeneity in reservation utilities is not too small or too great.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Saak, Alexander E.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 102.2009, 2, p. 67-69
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Monopoly Private information Random participation

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005296464