Private provision of discrete public goods
We investigate private provision of discrete public goods under refund and cost-sharing. If it is commonly believed that individuals may be warm-glow altruists and the group-size is a Poisson random variable, then the equilibrium distribution of collected contributions is uniquely determined. If composition uncertainty is very small and the expected group-size sufficiently large, the distribution of contributions can be described by concentrating in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. As the expected group-size increases, the probability a randomly selected player contributes and the associated expected number of contributions converge to the corresponding ones in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game with no uncertainty.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Makris, Miltiadis |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 67.2009, 1, p. 292-299
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Discrete public goods Warm-glow altruism Poisson games |
Saved in:
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