Prize and Incentives in Double-Elimination Tournaments

I examine a game-theoretical model of two variants of double-elimination tournaments, and derive the equilibrium behavior of symmetric players and the optimal prize allocation assuming a designer aims to maximize total effort. I compare these theoretical properties to the well-known single-elimination tournament

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Huang, Lingbo
Publisher:	[2017]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Anreiz \| Incentives \| Extensives Spiel \| Extensive form game \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 6, 2016 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3011715 [DOI]
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012950756