Prizes Versus Wages with Envy and Pride

We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses)

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Dubey, Pradeep K.
Other Persons:	Geanakoplos, John (contributor) ; Haimanko, Ori (contributor)
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Neid \| Envy \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Motivation \| Risikoaversion \| Risk aversion

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (27 p)
Series:	Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper ; No. 1835
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 22, 2011 erstellt
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118185