Probabilistic cheap talk
We consider a model in which there is uncertainty over when a one-shot game will be played. We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged. We also show that if there is no discounting, this uncertainty imparts a sequential structure that is almost mathematically equivalent to a repeated version of the game with discounting. In particular, a folk theorem applies to such games. Thus, games of probabilistic cheap provide a third interpretation of the repeated game framework with the additional feature that expected payoff is invariant to the probability of the game ending. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Chakravorti, Bhaskar ; Conley, John P. ; Taub, Bart |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 2, p. 281-294
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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