Procedimento para análise de decisão quanto à prevenção de doenças em animais: uma aplicação da Teoria dos Jogos

The basic hypothesis of this study is that producers do not realize, individually,the importance of adopting preventive measures, even aware of the economic risks for themand for the local economy, because outbreaks of some diseases are not frequent. Moreover,the presence of externalities makes the action of one producer regarding sanitary measuresof the herd affect other producers in the same region, which cannot be perceived by them,either. This study aims to develop a theoretical procedure to infer about strategic decisionstaken by producers to prevent animal disease in their herds, in face of the risk ofcontamination. The development of the model is based on the Game Theory, and thecost-benefit analysis as support for decision-making process. After modeling the problemand determining the equilibriums, they are used to elaborate inferences about possibleactions of the government through economic incentives (such as indemnities and fines) toencourage the prevention. Then, the theoretical model is applied to a specific case of afoot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in Brazil. Results indicate that with the absenceof a differentiated market for non-vaccinated animals, the game equilibrium tends to thesituation in which decisions of producer are to vaccinate their herd, suggesting thatgovernment intervention is not necessary. In practice, however, the Brazilian governmentuses incentive policies for cattle vaccination since some producers do not vaccinate theiranimals, despite their awareness of the risks, which suggests lack of rationality.