Procurement mechanisms for assortments of differentiated products
Year of publication: |
[2020]
|
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Authors: | Saban, Daniela ; Weintraub, Gabriel |
Publisher: |
[Stanford, CA] : [Stanford Graduate School of Business] |
Subject: | procurement | mechanism design | auctions | assortments | market design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Beschaffung | Procurement | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Auktion | Auction |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | Stanford University Graduate School of Business research paper. - Rochester, NY : Social Science Electronic Publishing, ZDB-ID 2865911-9. - Vol. no. 3453144] |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.3453144 [DOI] |
Classification: | D44 - Auctions ; d47 ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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