Product Liability, Entry Incentives and Market Structure

The article characterizes the entry incentives provided by increases in product liability under various forms of competition. It is demonstrated that the entry of small, high-cost firms is likely to occur in imperfectly competitive markets when the average damage increases with industry output. Special case are considered, including Cournot-Nash oligopoly and dominant firm-competitive fringe

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Hamilton, Stephen F. ; Sunding, David L.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Betriebsgröße \| Firm size \| Theorie \| Theory \| Produkthaftung \| Product liability \| Markteintritt \| Market entry \| Unvollkommener Markt \| Incomplete market \| Marktstruktur \| Market structure
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, Pp. 269-283, 2000 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014136187