Product Preannouncement, Market Cannibalization and Price Competition

This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the firms' incentives to preannounce their new products. We consider a two-period model where a single firm controls the market with one product in the first period and a new and better product is introduced in the second period, either by the same firm or by a new entrant on the market. In the single firm case, a preannouncement cannibalizes the sales of the old product in the first period.

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Year of publication:	1998
Authors:	Manceau, D. ; Bloch, F.
Institutions:	ESCP Europe
Subject:	GAME THEORY \| INFORMATION

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Series:	Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Paris. Groupe ESCP-.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	36 pages
Classification:	L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; D21 - Firm Behavior ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005474567