Project Assignment Rights and Incentives for Eliciting Ideas
Year of publication: |
2002
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arya, Anil ; Glover, Jonathan ; Routledge, Bryan R. |
Published in: |
Management Science. - Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences - INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909. - Vol. 48.2002, 7, p. 886-899
|
Publisher: |
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences - INFORMS |
Subject: | real options | incentive problems | decentralization | promotion |
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