Promoting incentives : performance improvement in container port terminals
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Saurí, Sergi ; Robusté, Francesc |
Published in: |
Transportation science : a journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : Transportation Science & Logistics Society of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, ISSN 0041-1655, ZDB-ID 160958-0. - Vol. 46.2012, 2, p. 233-246
|
Subject: | Containerterminal | Container terminal | Hafenwirtschaft | Port management | Privatisierung | Privatization | Monopol | Monopoly | Regulierung | Regulation | Konzession | Concession | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
-
Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities to maximise fee revenues
Chen, Hsiao-Chi, (2014)
-
Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities to maximize traffic volumes
Chen, Hsiao-Chi, (2015)
-
Chen, Hsiao-Chi, (2017)
- More ...
-
Promoting Incentives: Performance Improvement in Container Port Terminals
Saurí, Sergi, (2012)
-
Short sea shipping in Europe: issues, policies and challenges
Ng, Adolf K.Y.,
-
Stopover and hub-and-spoke shipment strategies in less-than-truckload carriers
Estrada-Romeu, Miquel, (2015)
- More ...