Providing global public goods under uncertainty
We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease participation. In that case, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare.
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Boucher, Vincent ; Bramoullé, Yann |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727. - Vol. 94.2010, 9-10, p. 591-603
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Global public goods Climate change International agreements Uncertainty Risk aversion |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
DO PEERS AFFECT STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT? EVIDENCE FROM CANADA USING GROUP SIZE VARIATION
Boucher, Vincent, (2014)
-
Do Peers Affect Student Achievement? Evidence from Canada Using Group Size Variation
Boucher, Vincent, (2010)
-
Do Peers Affect Student Achievement? Evidence from Canada Using Group Size Variation
Boucher, Vincent, (2012)
- More ...