Provision of club goods: cost sharing and selection of a provider

This paper characterizes optimal mechanisms facilitating the cost sharing and the selection of a provider for a club good. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur even when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomena disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Lescop, Denis
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2005, 25, p. 1-13
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094654