Provision of incentives for information acquisition : forecast-based contracts vs. menus of linear contracts
Year of publication: |
July 2016
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Authors: | Chen, Fangruo ; Lai, Guoming ; Xiao, Wenqiang |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 62.2016, 7, p. 1899-1914
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Subject: | information acquisition | sales and operations planning | moral hazard | adverse selection | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsversorgung | Information provision | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertrag | Contract |
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