Proximate preferences and almost full revelation in the Crawford-Sobel game
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Agastya, Murali ; Bag, Parimal Kanti ; Chakraborty, Indranil |
Published in: |
Economic theory bulletin. - Cham : Springer Internat. Publ., ISSN 2196-1093, ZDB-ID 2733052-7. - Vol. 3.2015, 2, p. 201-212
|
Subject: | Cheap talk | Strategic information transmission | Bias | Convergence | Full revelation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kommunikation | Communication | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Systemvoraussetzungen: PDF Reader |
Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s40505-014-0042-8 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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