Public attention and executive perks : evidence from China
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Zhang, Jian ; Yuan, Yue ; Zhang, Yinge ; Xu, Jian |
Published in: |
Finance research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1544-6123, ZDB-ID 2181386-3. - Vol. 48.2022, p. 1-6
|
Subject: | China | Information asymmetry | Agency cost | Executive perks | Public attention | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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