Public Choice Issues in Collective Action : Constituent Group Pressures and International Global Warming Regulation

There is a large and growing literature on scientific estimates and regulatory instruments associated with international efforts to control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The underlying collective action processes have received much less attention. In particular, bargaining among sovereign states and the associated domestic public choice issues that must be addressed as part of an agreement have been neglected. This paper examines the problems of international cooperation when the aggregate benefits and costs of the objective, as well as the net gains to the bargaining parties, are uncertain. Uncertainty arises due to basic information problems about the effects of the treaty and compliance by sovereign countries. We outline a two-stage analytical framework that describes the positions taken by representatives of negotiating countries and the internal public choice tradeoffs facing politicians when constituents are differentially affected by the treaty. We apply the framework to the Law of the Sea Treaty of 1982 (LOS), the Montreal Protocol to Control Substances that Damage the Ozone Layer of 1987, and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997. Similar international negotiation and internal constituency issues were faced in the first two treaties that provide implications for the success of international collective action to address possible global warming