Public Contracting for Private Innovation : Government Expertise, Decision Rights, and Performance Outcomes
We examine how the U.S. Federal Government governs R&D contracts with private-sector firms. The government chooses between two contractual forms: grants and cooperative agreements. The latter provides the government substantially greater discretion over, and monitoring of, project progress. Using novel data on R&D contracts and on the geo-location and technical expertise of each government scientist over a 12-year period, we test implications from the organizational economics and contracting literatures. We find that cooperative agreements are more likely to be used for early-stage projects and those for which local government scientific personnel have relevant technical expertise; in turn, cooperative agreements yield greater innovative output as measured by patents, controlling for endogeneity of contract form. The results are consistent with multi-task agency and transaction-cost approaches that emphasize decision rights and monitoring
Year of publication: |
2018
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Authors: | Bruce, Joshua R. |
Other Persons: | de Figueiredo, John M. (contributor) ; Silverman, Brian S. (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Öffentlich-private Partnerschaft | Public-private partnership | Industrieforschung | Industrial research | Patent | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Vertragsrecht | Contract law |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (72 p) |
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Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w24724 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 2018 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012916603