Public debt stabilization : the relevance of policymakers' time horizons
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; Di Pietro, Marco ; Saltari, Enrico ; Semmler, Willi |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 177.2018, 3/4, p. 287-299
|
Subject: | Political instability | Bounded rationality | Receding policy horizon | Present-centric policy thinking | Excessive public debts | Öffentliche Schulden | Public debt | Theorie | Theory | Begrenzte Rationalität | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Fiscal consolidation | Politische Instabilität |
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