Public Employees as Swing Voters: Empirical Evidence on Opposition to Public Reform
Reform offers economic gains for society at large, but can represent a threat to the interests of public employees. Public sector reform faces opposition from voters employed in public sector. Norwegian data allow for an analysis this interpretation. Survey data show that public employees prefer less reform than the rest of the population. The voting behavior of public employees is more sensitive to reform than is that of other voters (the swing voter hypothesis), and hence: shares of public employees in a local jurisdiction have a negative impact on the probability of reform.
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Rattsø, Jørn ; Sørensen, Rune J. |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 119.2004, 3_4, p. 281-310
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Political control of government enterprises: Who controls whom?
Rattsø, Jørn, (2012)
-
Grey power and public budgets: Family altruism helps children, but not the elderly
Rattsø, Jørn, (2010)
-
Local government service production : the politics of allocative sluggishness
Borge, Lars-Erik, (1995)
- More ...