Public Goods and Optimal Paternalism under Present-Biased Preferences

This paper deals with the optimal provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model, when the consumers have present-biased preferences due to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The results show that the preference for immediate gratification facing the (mimicking) high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust the public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.

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Year of publication:	2010-06-21
Authors:	Aronsson, Thomas ; Granlund, David
Institutions:	Institutionen för Nationalekonomi, Umeå Universitet
Subject:	Public Goods \| Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting \| Redistribution \| Asymmetric Information

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Umeå Economic Studies.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Umeå Economic Studies Number 811 7 pages
Classification:	D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008599463