Public Provision of Private Goods.
Government may provide a good that can, if legally permitted, be supplemented by private purchases. Policy is determined by majority rule. Under standard assumptions on preferences, a majority voting equilibrium exists. A regime of positive government provision with no restriction on private supplements is shown to be majority preferred to a regime of either only market provision or only government provision. Combined public and private expenditure on the good is higher under this dual-provision regime than under either of the alternatives. Under some preference configurations, the median-income voter is pivotal; under others, a voter with income below the median is pivotal. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Epple, Dennis ; Romano, Richard E |
Published in: |
Journal of Political Economy. - University of Chicago Press. - Vol. 104.1996, 1, p. 57-84
|
Publisher: |
University of Chicago Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects.
Epple, Dennis, (1998)
-
When Excessive Consumption Is Rational.
Romano, Richard E, (1991)
-
The Economics of Education: Editors Introduction.
De Fraja, Gianni, (2002)
- More ...