Public Provision of Private Goods

We consider an environment with asymmetric information about preferences for a public good and a private good. If the public good must be financed from contributions made by participants and if participants must be given incentives to participate in the mechanism, we show that there are circumstances when the private good should be bundled with the public good, in spite of the. We interpret this as an efficiency rationale for public provision of private goods

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Norman, Peter ; Fang, Hanming
Institutions:	Society for Economic Dynamics - SED
Subject:	Public Goods \| Bundling \| Efficiency

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Series:	2004 Meeting Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Society for Economic Dynamics 2004 Number 138
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; H41 - Public Goods ; H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027256