Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are observable, bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse. In contrast, when offers are hidden, agreement is always reached, although with delay. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Hörner, Johannes ; Vieille, Nicolas
Published in:	Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 77.2009, 1, p. 29-69
Publisher:	Econometric Society

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005231564