Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade-offs between high and low-powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage R&D activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Rietzke, David
Other Persons:	Chen, Yu (contributor)
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Anreiz \| Incentives

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (35 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 4, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3378121 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871711