Putting state-formation first: some recommendations for reconstruction and peace-making in Afghanistan

The authors suggest a revision of the current strategy of reconstruction and peace-building in Afghanistan with reference to four points. (i) The programme of reconstruction should have a clear strategic focus and be designed as a state-building project. The main problem Afghanistan faces is the absence of a monopoly of power and of other basic state functions, without which no sustainable economic development is to be expected. Fostering 'civil society'-the standard pre-occupation of many current development co-operation programmes-may have a negative impact in the cases of countries suffering from state failure. (ii) A monopoly of power cannot be established only by building up a central army and disarming or integrating local armed forces. Rather, the loyalty of the country's citizens must be won through a long-term process of providing them with equality before the law and protection from arbitrary violence in such a way as to make them independent of the 'protection' of local strong men or regional warlords. (iii) It is too early to achieve democracy in Afghanistan through elections. A democracy can only release the potential for political integration following successful political stabilization and institutional consolidation. And the institutional framework should be designed in such a way as to avoid an escalation of conflicts along ethno-religious lines. An ethno-religious quota system of the sort that many have in mind at the moment would tend rather to increase such conflict than to reduce it. (iv) A programme of reconstruction and peace-making must necessarily take a long-term perspective. Spending the resources that have now been approved over the next four years and hoping for a continuation of aid approvals in the future is too risky, given the dependence of these approvals on the future political climate. © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.