Qualified Majority Voting Explained
We explain the issue of the decision rule of the EU’s Council of Ministers. We outline, in as non-technical fashion as we can, the mathematical theory (due to L S Penrose) that addresses this sort of issue. We assess the decision rule prescribed in the Nice Treaty as well as that included in the Draft Constitution proposed by the European Convention. Finally, we propose our own solution to this problem.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Felsenthal, Dan S. ; Machover, Moshé |
Published in: |
Homo Oeconomicus. - Institute of SocioEconomics. - Vol. 21.2004, p. 573-576
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Publisher: |
Institute of SocioEconomics |
Saved in:
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