Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
We propose a simple qualitative methodology for improving the understanding of the nature of equilibrium strategies in asymmetric first-price sealed-bid auctions when departures from symmetry are weak. We exemplify this methodology through the exposition of three examples already studied in literature (Maskin and Riley, 2000a; Fibich and Gavious, 2003; Bajari, 2001).
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Momparler, Juan ; Gregori, Pablo |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 110.2011, 3, p. 220-222
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Asymmetric game Auction Phase plane |
Saved in:
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