Quality Dispersion and the Feasibility of Dividends as Signals
A dividend signaling equilibrium may not be feasible if some firms must pay an unrealistically high dividend to signal their quality. Therefore, feasibility requires a relatively narrow quality dispersion among signaling firms. However, the literature does not offer a characterization of the maximum quality dispersion that is consistent with a feasible signaling schedule. In this paper explicit quality dispersion constraints leading to feasible dividend signaling equilibria are determined.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Rodriguez, Ricardo J |
Published in: |
Journal of Financial Research. - Southern Finance Association - SFA, ISSN 0270-2592. - Vol. 15.1992, 4, p. 307-15
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Publisher: |
Southern Finance Association - SFA Southwestern Finance Association - SWFA |
Saved in:
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