Quality provision and governance structure variety: Pooling versus double markup

This paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Liang, Qiao ; Hendrikse, George W. J. ; Huang, Zuhui
Institutions:	Leibniz-Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Transformationsökonomien (IAMO)
Subject:	Quality \| Cooperatives \| Investor-Owned Firms

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IAMO Forum 2010: Institutions in Transition – Challenges for New Modes of Governance.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009370722