Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a "canonical extension," which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average over all adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Weber, Thomas A.
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Game Theory Review, Forthcoming Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 8, 2018 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2512882 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904669